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Abstract 
When and why do electoral commitments enhance partiesÕ ability to implement their 
preferred policy in multiparty governments? We propose an audience costs theory 
whereby strong platform commitments enhance partiesÕ negotiating positions in 
multiparty cabinets but only when they are on a salient policy issue for core voters 
and the party controls the policy-relevant portfolio. Utilizing new data on portfolio 
allocations in eight parliamentary democracies over 40 years, we show that absent a 
strong platform commitment, control of the portfolio of social affairs by social 
democrats, alone, is not associated with changes in welfare generosity. Notably, our 
findings are independent of party size and hold in most multiparty legislative systems 
not dominated by three parties. 
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Electoral commitments
2
 are at the heart of multiparty competition. In the run-up to 
elections, political parties lay out their policy positions and promises in an attempt to 
win votes and, ultimately, claim office (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Baron 1993). 
Pledges that dominate newspaper headlinesÑsuch as ÒLib Dems would end austerity 
in three yearsÓ(Wintour and Watt 2015)Ñand policy commitments found in electoral 
manifestosÑsuch as ÒUnder Labour, the NHS will remain a universal health serviceÓ 
(Labour 2010)Ñprovide crucial information to voters regarding the specifics of 
partiesÕ policy positions  and the importance they assign to them. However, strong 
electoral commitments potentially Ôtie the handsÕ of political parties once in 
government, to the extent that failing to act upon them could result in voter 
disapproval (Armingeon and Giger 2008; Hillebrand and Irwin 1999; Thomson 
2011).
3
  
Yet, when and how strong electoral commitments affect policy outcomes in 
multiparty cabinets is, as yet, poorly understood. Some scholars find that the control 
of ministerial portfolios and coalition agreements are critical for effectively 
influencing policy in multiparty cabinets (Thomson et al. 2014; Schermann and 
Ennser-Jedenastik 2015; Mansergh and Thomson 2007; Laver and Shepsle 1996; 
Back, Debus, and Tosun 2015). Others instead, find that policy is decided by cabinets 
collectively and reflects partiesÕ ideology weighted by their size, independently of the 
distribution of portfolios (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Martin and Vanberg 2014).  
                                                
2
Electoral commitments include both ÔspecificÕ and ÔdetailedÕ pledges that stipulate a 
precise course of action regarding a policy as well as more ÔvagueÕ and ÔgeneralÕ 
pledges that stipulate a commitment to a course of action (Bara 2005).  
3
 For example, the British Liberal Democrats suffered a major electoral defeat in the 
2015 elections for breaking their pledge to defend low tuition fees (Weaver 2015).   
 3 
Focusing on social welfare policy, this article asks: once a political party 
enters a coalition government, do its electoral commitments constrain or enable it to 
formulate policy? Do electoral promises matter for policy or are they Ôcheap talkÕ? 
Under what conditions? We develop a theory of policymaking in multiparty cabinets 
that provides the conditions under which electoral promises strengthen partiesÕ 
negotiating position. Drawing from models of bargaining with pre-negotiation 
commitment (Leventoglu and Tarar 2005), we argue that the party with the highest 
audience costs
4
  attached to the policy in question has the greatest leverage. We 
identify three necessary conditions that increase partiesÕ audience costs while in 
government: they have agenda setting power through the control of portfolios, and 
they have made a strong electoral commitment on a salient policy for party voters.  
We test our theoretical expectations on social welfare policy. This is an area 
about which voters care deeply (Pierson 1996; Commission 2009), particularly in rich 
European countries where the costs and benefits of welfare are highly visible 
(Gingrich 2014). Nonetheless, even in the UK, known for its Ôminimal welfare stateÕ 
(Esping-Andersen 1990), social welfare policy has been found to be the second most 
important electoral issue after the economy (Bara 2005). The political significance of 
social welfare policy in western European countries is also explained by the fact that 
tax and social welfare policies constitute the majority of legislative bills (Martin and 
Vanberg 2014). The recent financial crisis has revived the heated debates of the 
eighties and the nineties over austerity, making it all the more important to understand 
                                                
4
 The term Ôaudience costsÕ is broader than electoral costs (Fearon 1994; Jensen 2003). 
In our case audience costs refer to loss in voter support as measured by polls and 
which can have direct electoral consequences but also to party audience costs such as 
declining party membership, support by the party base, and even intra-party defeat by 
more policy-oriented challengers (Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999).  
 4 
the political conditions under which the welfare state can be protected. Unsurprisingly, 
the politics of welfare state reform have been central in the literature of comparative 
political economy and have been hotly debated (Pierson 1996; Korpi and Palme 2003; 
Allan and Scruggs 2004; Horn and Jensen Forthcoming; Giger and Nelson 2011).
5
  
Utilizing three new datasets across eight multiparty parliamentary 
democracies over 40 years, we find strong support for our expectations. Controlling 
the portfolio of social affairs is a necessary condition for social democratic parties to 
defend welfare generosity, but only when they made strong pro-welfare commitments. 
Their impact on policy further increases when they control the portfolio of finance, 
which directly disperses funds to individual spending departments, and independently 
of the total number of seats the party controls. Importantly, in the absence of such 
commitments, portfolio control alone has no policy effect. Taken together, then, these 
findings suggest a revised understanding of the conditions that lead to welfare policy 
reform in multiparty cabinets.  
We make three important contributions. First, counter to most existing work 
on welfare state reform (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi and Palme 2003; Allan and 
Scruggs 2004; Iversen and Stephens 2008)
6
 we explicitly account for partiesÕ pro-
welfare promises on changes in welfare generosity in multiparty cabinets.
 
We 
maintain that strong pro-welfare platform commitments do not necessarily translate 
into more generous welfare benefits but neither are they cheap talk. Strong pro-
welfare commitments can be effective when made by a traditionally pro-welfare party, 
                                                
5
 For an extensive review on the politics of welfare state reform see Kersbergen and 
Vis (2014). 
6
 but see also Schumacher (2011) and Horn and Jensen (Forthcoming) for recent 
contributions on the role of partiesÕ electoral promises in social welfare reform. 
 5 
namely by social democrats and when that party is in charge of the social affairs 
portfolio, irrespective of the number of seats they control in the cabinet.  
Second, we contribute to the important debate in the literature of 
policymaking in multiparty cabinets. Understanding how electoral promises affect 
social welfare policy lies at the heart of scholarly inquiry regarding governance and 
representation, and contributes to long-standing debates regarding the policymaking 
process in multiparty cabinets (Back, Debus, and Tosun 2015; Goodhart 2013; 
Franzese 2002; Tsebelis 2002; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Martin and Vanberg 2014; 
Budge and Hofferbert 1990; Hofferbert and Budge 1992; Allan and Scruggs 2004; 
Clark 2003).  
Third, we provide scope conditions for competing models of policymaking. 
We go beyond adjudicating on models of policymaking by providing the conditions 
under which alternative models of policymaking are more likely to prevail. We do 
that by explicitly taking into account the role of legislative complexity in party 
competition with the aid of a new dataset (Laver and Benoit 2015). We show that 
portfolio control enhances the agenda-setting role of social democratic parties 
primarily in more complex and decentralized legislative systems. In contrast, in 
triangular legislative systems, changes in welfare generosity are best explained by the 
cabinetÕs weighted average commitments as predicted by Ôcoalition compromise 
theoriesÕ (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Baron 1993; Martin and Vanberg 2014).  
Welfare State Reform and Models of Policymaking  
It is often assumed that parties are held accountable by voters, and fearing electoral 
punishment, they seek to fulfill their electoral promises (Hofferbert and Budge 1992; 
Baron 1993). Yet, many theoretical and empirical analyses of welfare state reform fail 
 6 
to include partiesÕ expected political costs as well as partiesÕ agenda-setting power in 
the policymaking process.  
With few notable exceptions (Schumacher 2011; Horn and Jensen 
Forthcoming), scholars of welfare states have mostly employed measures of partiesÕ 
left-right ideology (as determined by party families or by expertsÕ assessments) 
weighted by the proportion of party seats in the cabinet to predict policy (Allan and 
Scruggs 2004; Franzese 2002; Korpi and Palme 2003). While this expectation is both 
theoretically and empirically informed (Korpi and Palme 2003) it ignores the potential 
electoral costs for failing to follow through with specific electoral promises (Giger 
and Nelson 2011). Unlike measures of party ideology, which are rather stable over 
time, electoral platforms vary across elections, revealing the saliency of specific 
issues and signaling different levels of commitment to policies (Benoit and Laver 
2006; Hofferbert and Budge 1992; Budge and Hofferbert 1990; Schumacher 2011).
7
 
Furthermore, the dominant approaches within the comparative study of 
welfare states mostly ignore the agenda-setting power of parties through the control of 
ministerial portfolios, despite otherwise assumptions often made by scholars of 
government formation (Carroll and Cox 2007; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008). 
Laver and Shepsle (1996), in particular, argue that parties dictate policy by being in 
charge of ministerial portfolios. Yet research on the role of cabinet ministers in 
welfare state reform is still limited (Becher 2010; Martin and Vanberg 2014; 
Goodhart 2013; Alexiadou 2015).  In what follows we provide a theory and the 
conditions for ministerial agenda-setting power in multiparty cabinets.  
                                                
7
 Platform commitments are more directly affected by party competition and changes 
in public opinion than party ideology (Adams, Haupt, and Stoll 2009; Hofferbert and 
Budge 1992).  
 7 
Theory 
Audience Costs and Policy Negotiation in Minimal-Winning Coalitions 
How does accounting for partiesÕ audience costs alter our understanding of the 
process of social welfare reform in coalition cabinets? After the government has 
formed and portfolios have been agreed on, when should we expect parties to stand 
firmer on their policy positions?
 8
 
Let us assume that parties (and by extension their ministers) have three goals. 
First, they want to minimize the distance between the policy outcome and their 
partyÕs ideal point, which is a function of its ideology, broadly defined by its party 
family. Second, parties fear future electoral and broader political costs for proposing 
or accepting a policy that clearly contradicts their electoral promises, particularly so 
when their promises are on issues their voters feel strongly about. Third, parties value 
office so they generally prefer compromise to walking away when a policy dispute in 
the coalition arises. However, some parties are more office-seeking than others 
(Schumacher, Vries, and Vis 2013; Adams et al. 2006). 
With the aid of a formal bargaining model provided in Section A of the 
Appendix, we identify the conditions that lead to policy stability and change. We 
predict that in a situation where a social affairs minister is presented with a proposal 
                                                
8
 There is a large formal (Diermeier 2006) and empirical (Glasgow, Golder, and 
Golder 2011; Golder, Golder, and Siegel 2012) literature on government formation. It 
is beyond the scope of our paper to predict how electoral platforms affect government 
formation. Moreover, our model does not endogenously predict partiesÕ electoral 
commitments or portfolio allocation, thus it differs from the seminal works of Laver 
and Shepsle (1996) and Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) or Baron (1993). Also, 
unlike these works we assume that parties cannot perfectly predict future coalition 
governments and that coalition policy agreements are not perfectly enforceable.  
 8 
to cut social welfare benefits, she is able to block the proposal only when her party has 
made a sufficiently strong policy commitment to defend welfare benefits, social 
welfare policy is a salient policy
9
 for the partyÕs core voters, and all parties in the 
coalition are moderately office-seeking. If, on the other hand, her party made only a 
weak pledge while the party of the finance minister made a strong commitment to cut 
spending, then the social affairs minister cannot block financeÕs proposed cuts. In the 
absence of pledges from both parties, there is no policy change.  
The intuition here is that the higher the expected electoral penalty from 
diverging from the partyÕs promised policy is, the closer the final policy outcome will 
be to the ideal point of the two agenda-setter ministers. This is because voters assign 
responsibility to the ministers with agenda setting power (Duch and Stevenson 2013; 
Angelova, Knig, and Proksch Forthcoming). The ministers of finance and social 
affairs are both significant agenda setters with respect to social welfare policy, 
because it is an electorally salient policy and it accounts for a large percentage of the 
governmentÕs budget. Thus the model predicts the direction of policy change on the 
basis of the expected audience costs of these ministersÕ respective parties, which in 
turn is a function of party ideology and their pro- or anti- welfare commitments.  
A direct implication of the model is that the partisan control of cabinet seats 
and even of the portfolio of social affairs cannot alone predict policy change. If social 
democrats control the portfolio of social affairs but have made no commitments to 
increase welfare benefits, we do not expect positive changes in benefits. Similarly, if 
finance is controlled by a right of center party, she/he will not be able to cut benefits 
                                                
9
 While scholars use electoral statements to identify shifts in partiesÕ ideal policy, we 
assume that parties have fixed policy preferences, as revealed by their party family, 
and that their electoral pledges raise the saliency of these fixed policy preferences.  
 9 
unless her party has made a strong pledge to cut benefits while the party of the social 
affairs minister has made a weak pledge to defend welfare benefits.  
Thus we expect changes in welfare generosity to be best predicted by the 
partisan control of the portfolios of social affairs and finance, conditional on their 
specific pro and anti- welfare commitments. This prediction differs significantly from 
the compromise coalition theories (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988) for which changes 
in welfare generosity reflect partiesÕ welfare commitments conditional on their size. 
Our predictions also differ from the predictions of ministerial government theories 
(Laver and Shepsle 1996) under which ministers are policy dictators unconditionally.  
These predictions rest on two central assumptions; that voters punish parties 
for reneging on their promises, especially when these promises are on a salient issue 
for party core voters and that voters attribute policy responsibility to the party that 
formally sets the policy agenda. There is growing evidence that informed voters and 
party core voters, alike, are attentive of partiesÕ electoral promises and policy shifts 
(Thomson 2011; Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 2014).  
Even though our predictions are in line with historical cases,
10
 there is no 
large-n empirical evidence that voters punish the party that controls the portfolio of 
social affairs for welfare cuts. We fill this gap with our own preliminary analysis 
provided in Section B in the Appendix. We combined our data with comparative 
electoral data (CSES) to directly test whether voters are attentive of social democratÕs 
                                                
10
 Both the Irish Labour party and the Dutch Social-democrats, PvdA, experienced 
first-hand the effects of voter disapproval for perceived failures to follow through 
with their electoral promises while in in charge of social affairs (Hillebrand and Irwin 
1999; Marsh and Mitchell 1999). 
 10 
social welfare effort when they control the portfolio of social affairs.
11
The results, 
presented in Table 2 in the online Appendix are clear: voters are more likely to vote 
for social democratic parties when the social democrats raise welfare generosity, 
having promised to do so. Importantly, voters who casted their ballot for social 
democrats in the previous election, are a lot more likely to vote for social democrats 
again if they raised welfare generosity while being in charge of the portfolio of social 
affairs.  
 
Electoral Commitments, Party Ideology and the Welfare State 
There is an extensive literature on the historical roots and the political 
determinants of reforming the welfare state (for an extensive review of the literature 
see Kersbergen and Vis (2014)). Generally, scholars agree that liberal and 
conservative parties favor a slimmer welfare state while social democrats and 
Christian democrats have supported a more generous welfare state (Esping-Andersen 
1990; Korpi and Palme 2003; Manow and Kersberger 2009; Baldwin 1992; Huber, 
Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Korpi 1983). At the same time, Christian democrats have 
historically appealed to religious and more affluent voters (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; 
Dalton 2008). As a result, social welfare policy has been more salient for social 
democratic parties and their voters than for Christian democrats, even though both 
parties have been instrumental in the development of welfare states in Europe.  
Also, social democrats tend to ÔownÕ the issue of welfare state policy 
compared to Christian democrats (Blomquist and Green-Pedersen 2004). Thus, when 
it comes to social welfare policy, social democrats should have a hard time justifying 
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 In these models we predict the individual level vote choice for 17 elections. See 
Section B in the online Appendix.  
 11 
cuts in welfare benefits to their core voters and party activists, particularly when they 
promised to defend and uphold them in the campaign trail. This is more so when they 
are in charge of the portfolio of social affairs. No social democrat minister would 
want to present legislation that negates the partyÕs electoral promises on a policy that 
defines the partyÕs, and its core votersÕ policy priorities.
12
 
These important differences among partiesÕ support bases allow us to derive 
testable hypotheses. We expect social democrats to best defend welfare benefits 
generosity when they control the portfolio of social affairs and have committed 
electorally to do so. (H1a). This conditional pro-welfare effect should be stronger 
when social democrats also control the portfolio of finance (H1b) or, when the party 
of the finance minister has not pledged to cut benefits (H1c). 
13
 
Empirics 
DV and Empirical strategy 
Our data cover eight European parliamentary democracies that are 
overwhelmingly governed by multiparty governments and where both social and 
Christian democrats have held the portfolio of social affairs.
 14
 We restrict the analysis 
to the period between 1972-2010 due to data availability for the dependent variable. 
We include only minimum winning, minority multiparty and oversized cabinets that 
would lose their majority if the social democratic party left the coalition. We do not 
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 Unless she is an ideologue (see Alexiadou (2016)). 
13
 Hypothesis H1a is somewhat ÔnaveÕ since it only accounts for the pledge of the 
social affairs minister. Hypotheses H1b and H1c instead also account for the veto role 
of the finance minister. 
14
 Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden.  
 12 
include oversized coalitions due to the central assumption in our theoretical model 
that ministersÕ negotiating power rests on their ability to walk out and threaten the life 
of the coalition. In oversized cabinets, any individual party has less negotiating power 
if there are alternative majorities (Volden and Carrubba 2004).
15
  
The dependent variable is Total Welfare State Generosity, constructed by 
Scruggs, Detlef, and Kuitto (2013). It codes welfare generosity accounting for benefit 
replacement rates, qualifying conditions and coverage rates for public pensions, 
unemployment and sickness insurance. It is the most comprehensive and updated 
measure for welfare state generosity, which does not rely on actual spending. 
Aggregate spending measures are problematic because they vary with GDP and they 
fail to capture the generosity of benefits in terms of the actual replacements rates, the 
qualifying conditions and the coverage rates (Korpi and Palme 2003; Scruggs 2006; 
Mares 2006).  
Our empirical strategy involves the estimation of an Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag model (ADL) that excludes the contemporaneous regressors. ADL 
models are appropriate when the time series are strongly auto-regressive and near 
integrated (Keele, Linn, and Webb 2016; Grant and Lebo 2016).
16
 All the regressors 
are lagged by one year, which is a common practice for these types of empirical 
models, as political decisions take time before they become policy (Franzese 2002). 
All policy models include country fixed effects to remove unobserved country 
heterogeneity:  
Y
t
= a
i
+ a
1
Y
t−1
+ b
1
X
t−1
+ ε
t
     (1) 
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 See Section D in the online Appendix for robustness checks.    
16
 According to the Im-Pesaran-Shin unit root test for finite T and N, we can reject the 
null that our DV has a unit root in all the panels at the 10% level.  
 13 
IVs: Pro-welfare pledges & Partisan Portfolios 
To measure pro-welfare pledge, we employ data on social welfare platform 
statements from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). While measures of party 
ideology are more or less fixed over time, partiesÕ electoral platforms vary across 
elections, revealing the saliency of specific issues and signaling different levels of 
commitment to specific policies (Benoit and Laver 2006; Hofferbert and Budge 1992; 
Budge and Hofferbert 1990; Schumacher 2011).  
We use two indicators to measure the strength of the pledge. To test H1a we 
employ the indicator left welfare commitments, which is coded as social democratic 
favorable mentions minus negative mentions of the need to introduce, maintain or 
expand public social service or social security, and includes healthcare, child-care, 
pensions and housing.
17
 This variable is constructed by subtracting the code 505 from 
the code 504 in the Manifesto Data Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 
2006).
18
 However, this measure is somewhat ÔnaveÕ in that it does not take into 
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 This variable ranges from zero to 22 and is set to zero when the left is in opposition.  
18
 The CMP data counts statements- referred to as quasi-sentences- found in partiesÕ 
manifestos, which are then designated to one of 56 categories. We use category Ô504Õ 
and Ô505Õ, which are devoted to statements on welfare state expansion and limitation, 
respectively. These statements vary from being specific and detailed such as Òthe net 
replacement rate for unemployed persons will be raisedÓ (Austrian Social Democrats, 
2008 election) to vague and general such as Òwe want people with disabilities to take 
advantage of available benefits and servicesÓ (SPD 2009). While the CMP data have 
been critiqued by several authors, no other publicly available dataset provides 
comparable coverage and comparability. Also, the majority of criticisms concentrate 
on the indicator ÔrileÕ, which measures partiesÕ left-right position (Benoit and Laver 
2007; Molder Forthcoming; Franzmann and Kaiser 2006) and not on individual CMP 
categories (Lowe et al. 2011). Finally, a study finds that although all of the methods 
 14 
account the negative pledges made by the party of the finance minister. According to 
the predictions of the model and H1c, we must account for the commitments of both 
cabinet ministers involved in the policymaking process. Thus we also code net 
welfare commitments. To construct this alternative indicator we set to zero left welfare 
commitments every time a right of center party controls finance and has made a 
commitment in its manifesto to cut benefits. The reason we do that instead of 
subtracting financeÕs negative pledges from the pledges the social affairs minister is 
that parties rarely made pledges to cut benefits. Typically when they intend to cut 
benefits they avoid raising the issue altogether. This explains why the mean value of 
financeÕs anti-welfare commitments is only 0.3 while the mean value of left pro-
welfare commitments is 7.8, when they control social affairs
19
  
To create the indicator left and right welfare pledges, we identify the major 
center-left and center-right political parties in the countries in our sample. We used 
the largest party (in terms of vote share) from party families that are located in the left 
and the center-right of the ideological scale. The largest social democratic party in 
each country is coded as left. Under center-right we coded either the largest 
conservative or the largest Christian-democratic party in the country.
 20
 
                                                                                                                                      
carry issues they are most pronounced in extreme parties, which are not included in 
this study (Marks et al. 2007). 
19
 There are only 20 such country/year instances, mostly concentrated in Ireland in the 
eighties and the Netherlands in the nineties. See the online Appendix for descriptives.  
20
 Our coding decision was informed by the size of the largest party families in the 
countries we study. The current classification allows us to compare the Christian 
democrats with the ÔconservativesÕ in countries such as Sweden or Norway where are 
small. The list of the parties coded is provided in the online Appendix.  
 15 
Our second main predictor is social democratic social affairs portfolio. All the 
countries in the sample have had a ministry of social affairs for over half a century. In 
some cases the ministry is independent of other ministries while in other cases it is 
merged with the ministry of labor or health. We have constructed a unique dataset that 
codes the party that is in charge of social affairs, both at the start but also during the 
governmentÕs life. Our dataset first identifies the ministerial department responsible 
for social welfare policy,
21
 second tracks changes in ministerial jurisdictions over 
time and across space, and third codes cabinet and ministerial reshuffles. It codes all 
ministerial reshuffles, as long as a minister remained in his or her post for at least 2 
calendar months. In addition we use the average social democratic control of the 
social affairs and finance portfolios to test H1b. Given the important role of the 
minister of finance in social welfare policy, it is possible that we are overestimating 
the policy effect of social affairs ministers when we do not account for the partisan 
control of the portfolio of finance. Furthermore, utilizing this additional indicator we 
can compare whether the partisan control of finance (H1b) or financeÕs anti-welfare 
pledges matter the most for blocking the minister of social affairs (H1c).  
We test our hypotheses against two alternative models of policymaking. One 
that predicts policy to be an outcome of the policy preferences of inner cabinets 
(Thiebault 1993), here coded as the average control of the portfolios of the prime 
minister, finance, social affairs and employment by social democrats, and a second 
that predicts that policy reflects the cabinetÕs weighted average net welfare 
commitment (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988).   
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 Summary statistics are provided in the online Data Appendix. 
 16 
All the empirical models include the following control variables: left cabinet 
seats and economic growth.
22
 We include left cabinet seats to control for party size. 
and economic growth to address the possibility that social democrats make strong 
pro-growth pledges and control the portfolio of social affairs when the economy is 
strong. 
The data have been modified from government level to country/year 
observations. Portfolios are assigned a party family and a pro-welfare commitment 
score. If a ministry changed hands during a calendar year or if there were multiple 
elections in a year, the value assigned in that year is the value of the last election. We 
assume that if there is more than one election in one year, the government(s) that form 
and lead the country to new elections within a calendar year would have no time to 
initiate and implement new policies within the brief period of holding office.  
Findings 
Equations 1-6 of Table 1 strongly support our theoretical expectations as 
derived from the bargaining model. Neither a strong pro-welfare pledge nor the 
control of the relevant portfolios alone is associated with higher welfare benefit 
generosity. Social democrats cannot increase welfare generosity when they control the 
department of social affairs but have made no commitment to expand social welfare. 
Similarly, when social democrats are in government but do not control the department 
                                                
22
 In the online Appendix, Section D, we provide additional models that include the 
controls of unemployment and wage bargaining coordination. We expect long-term 
high unemployment to negatively affect social benefits as it puts pressure on state 
finances. Wage bargaining has been instrumental in the formation and preservation of 
the welfare state, particularly under social democrats (Katzenstein 1985; Esping-
Andersen 1990; Korpi and Palme 2003). The index codes the levels at which wages 
are set, where 1 is the least and 5 is the most centralized level (Visser 2013). 
 17 
of social affairs, their commitment to expand social welfare has a small negative 
effect on welfare state generosity. Perhaps even more surprising is that larger 
representation of left parties in the cabinet does not increase welfare generosity. 
Instead and in line with our expectations, the left is associated with higher welfare 
generosity only when it has made a strong electoral commitment to defend benefits 
and controls the portfolio of social affairs (H1a), particularly if the party of the 
finance minister has not pledged to cut benefits (H1c).  
In Equation 1 of Table 1, we see that the interactive term Social Democratic 
Welfare Pledge*Social Democratic Ministry of Social Affairs is positive and 
statistically significant, even after controlling for the leftÕs electoral strength and for 
the cabinetÕs weighted average pro-welfare pledge. This effect is stronger when the 
left also controls the portfolio of finance as predicted by H1b and shown in Equation 
2. However, controlling more portfolios on top of social affairs and finance does not 
deliver any further benefits, according to Equation 3.  
 The conditional positive effect of controlling social affairs is considerably 
stronger when we account for the negative pledges made by financeÕs party (H1c). 
These results are reported in Equation 4. Overall, the largest conditional effects are 
observed either when the left controls both social affairs and finance, assuming strong 
pro-welfare commitment, or when the minister of finance has not made a pledge to 
cut benefits. In fact, the additive effects are stronger when the social affairs minister 
deals with a ÔfriendlyÕ right of center finance minister than when she deals with a 
social democrat finance minister. Controlling the portfolio of finance per se is not 
required or even helpful for increasing welfare benefits, as long as the party that 
controls finance has not pledged to cut benefits.   
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Table 1: Welfare generosity, pro-welfare electoral commitments and social democrats 
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	 Welfare		
Generosity	
Welfare		
Generosity	
Welfare		
Generosity	
Welfare		
Generosity	
	 	 	 	 	
	 (H1a)	 (H1b)	 	 (H1c)	
Generosity	Lag	 0.9557***	 0.9466***	 0.9477***	 0.9446***	
	 (0.034)	 (0.034)	 (0.036)	 (0.033)	
Econ.	Growth	 0.0758	 0.0704*	 0.0783	 0.0807**	
	 (0.044)	 (0.036)	 (0.043)	 (0.033)	
Left	cabinet	seats	%	 0.0053	 0.0060	 0.0070	 0.0030	
	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	 (0.006)	 (0.004)	
Ave	Cabinet	Pledge	 0.0039	 -0.0068	 -0.0017	 -0.0069	
	 (0.015)	 (0.017)	 (0.015)	 (0.021)	
Left	Pledge	 -0.0540	 -0.0722**	 -0.0635**	
		 (0.031)	 (0.028)	 (0.026)	
	SD	S.	Affairs	 -0.3560**	
	 	
-0.5437**	
	 (0.148)	
	 	
(0.175)	
Left	Pledge*SD	Affairs	 0.0531*	
	 	 		 (0.027)	
	 	 	Ave	SD	Affairs/Finance	
	
-0.6431***	
	 		
	
(0.175)	
	 	Left	Pledge*	SD	Aff/Fin	
	
0.1102**	
	 		
	
(0.041)	
	 	SD	Inner	Cabinet	
	 	
-0.6739**	
		
	 	
(0.209)	
	Left	Pledge*Inner	Cab	
	 	
0.0868**	
		
	 	
(0.029)	
	Net	Pledge	
	 	 	
-0.0638**	
	
	 	 	
(0.018)	
Net	Pledge*	SD	Affairs	
	 	 	
0.1096**	
	
	 	 	
(0.034)	
Constant	 1.4737	 1.8794	 1.8016	 1.9071	
	 (1.120)	 (1.137)	 (1.159)	 (1.116)	
	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 192	 192	 192	 192	
R-squared	 0.899	 0.904	 0.901	 0.903	
Number	of	countries	 8	 8	 8	 8	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	 	 	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	 	 	
All models include country fixed effects 
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We should further note that the added benefit of controlling the portfolio of 
finance is not as important as it might at first appear. In our sample, the left has 
controlled the department of social affairs more than three quarters of the time and the 
portfolio of finance half the time, when in government. Crucially, only half of the 
time the left has controlled social affairs it has also controlled finance, but when it has 
controlled finance it almost always has controlled social affairs (89% of the time).
23
 
Thus, even though being in charge of both the social affairs and finance portfolios 
increases the leftÕs policy impact, the effect of controlling the social affairs portfolio 
alone has significant policy effects, given strong pro-welfare commitments. 
One might ask how far away from the cabinet average policy position can the 
social affairs ministerÕs party push policy? To answer this question we need to 
investigate the policy effects of the social democrat minister when her partyÕs pledge 
is higher than the average cabinet pledge. Indeed, this is the case in more than fifty 
percent of all cases in our sample. Our empirical model informs us that if the social 
democrat minister acts as a perfect agent of the cabinet with an average welfare score 
of about 6.5, she would increase social welfare benefits by about 0.2 units in the 
short-run and by 3 units in the long-run, which is equivalent to just under 13 percent 
increase. If, on the other hand, the social affairs minister follows her partyÕs pro-
welfare commitment (after modifying for financeÕs negative commitment) at the 
average level of 9, she would increase welfare generosity by 0.44 units in the short-
run and by 7.3 units in the long-run which is equivalent to about 30 percent increase 
in welfare generosity.
24
  
                                                
23 For summary statistics, see Table 14 in the online Appendix 
24
 The derivation of these estimates can be found in the log file: 
log_replication_psrm_ppp_main.log. 
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Figure 1 makes clear that controlling the portfolio of social affairs bears no 
positive changes in welfare generosity unless the net pro-welfare pledge is at average 
or higher values. Importantly for making inferences, half of the time social democrats 
controlled social affairs in multiparty cabinets they made strong pro-welfare 
commitments (on average a value of about 9), while the other half of the time their 
pro-welfare commitments were on average 3.
25
 To conclude, when the social 
democrats make a pledge stronger than that of the cabinet and they are not confronted 
with a hostile finance minister (H1c),
26
 they moved policy away from what it would 
be under the cabinetÕs weighted pledge, independently of party size or the partisan 
control of the portfolio of finance. 
27
 
Party ideology, platform commitments and portfolio control are all necessary 
conditions for policy influence in multiparty cabinets. These effects hold despite 
controlling for the cabinetÕs weighted average pro-welfare commitments. In fact the 
cabinetÕs average pro-welfare commitment has a negative coefficient.
28
 Moreover, 
these results do not hold for Christian democratic parties, as shown in Section D in 
the online Appendix. We believe that this finding further supports our expectation that 
electoral promises are binding only for highly salient policy issues, when controlling 
the policy agenda.   
                                                
25
 See Table 14 in the online Appendix. 
26
 Graphs for H1a and H1b are provided in the online Appendix, Section D.  
27
 While we explicitly account for partiesÕ strategic pledges by modeling legislative 
complexity, we might fail to account for unobservable factors that drive partiesÕ 
welfare effort, for example, due to intra-party conflict. To address this potential 
endogeneity we utilize control function estimators to predict the conditional policy 
effects of pledges and portfolios, while controlling for un-observables (Wooldridge 
2002). See Section D in the Appendix 
28
 For alternative specifications see Section D in the online Appendix.  
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Figure 1: Marginal effects of Partisan Portfolio Control as Welfare Commitment Varies 
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Identifying scope conditions  
How generalizable are the findings of Table 1? To what extent are pledges 
endogenous to partiesÕ expectations of fulfilling them, and thus not an outcome of 
intra-ministerial bargaining?  
Our central predictions and findings, that partiesÕ policy influence is a 
function of them having agenda control and having made strong electoral 
commitments have direct implications for partiesÕ incentives to form strong pro-
welfare commitments and control the portfolio of social affairs. Chronologically, 
parties make electoral commitments, then negotiate over policy and portfolios and 
finally renegotiate over policy during the life of government. If parties had perfect 
foresight regarding the government formation process and the state of the economy, 
they would only make strong pro-welfare commitments and wish to control the 
portfolio of social affairs when they expect to be in government and, once in 
government, to follow through with their commitments.  
Indeed, the assumptions of perfect foresight are made by Austen-Smith and 
Banks (1988) and Baron (1993) in their seminal works of government formation and 
policy outcomes in multiparty governments. Yet, votersÕ and partiesÕ perfect foresight 
is justified by the fact that only three parties compete and any two parties can form a 
majority coalition. The government that forms consists of the parties with the most 
and the least votes, hence the final policy outcome is either center-left or center-right. 
In these models, the final policy outcome is a compromise among the coalition 
partners, with the largest party having the most policy influence (Austen-Smith and 
Banks 1988). Empirically, this means that policy outcomes reflect the cabinetÕs 
weighted average commitments. 
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Germany met these criteria during the seventies whereby the three main 
parties, the Christian democrats (CDU), the social democrats (SPD) and the smaller 
liberals (FDP) could form two-party majority coalitions. Under these conditions 
parties should be able to predict fairly accurately their ÔidealÕ pledge given the 
pledges of the other two parties. Moreover, in such stable coalitional environments 
parties should predict reasonably accurately their policy leverage as well as the 
ministerial portfolio allocation, especially in the presence of strong norms on portfolio 
allocation. Laver and Benoit (2015) call these triangular legislative systems, Top-
Three Party System legislatures.  
Nonetheless only a subset of parliamentary legislatures are triangular (Laver 
and Benoit 2015). Pledge formation is less predictable outside well-defined 
coalitional environments (Laver and Benoit 2015). In most legislative systems, partiesÕ 
chances of entering a coalition might be too hard to predict due to high levels of 
legislative fragmentation and complexity or due to the presence of a dominant party 
(Laver and Benoit 2015). Thus, outside triangular systems, the assumptions that 
parties have perfect foresight and can freely choose their post-electoral coalition 
partners have to be relaxed. If parties are less able to predict the post-electoral 
government formation process, then they might be less likely to tailor their electoral 
pledges to their expectations. In these situations partiesÕ optimal strategy is to 
formulate electoral pledges that are primarily vote maximizing instead of office or 
policy maximizing.
29
 Therefore, outside triangular systems we can reasonably assume 
that partiesÕ pro-welfare pledges are at least partly orthogonal to their ability to 
influence policy in the future.  
                                                
29
 For a formal intuition of partiesÕ utility function of forming a bold electoral 
commitment, see Section C in the online Appendix 
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If the legislative environment matters for policymaking processes, then we 
should find that coalition compromise theories are more prevalent in triangular 
systems whereas our theory is more prevalent outside triangular systems. We test this 
expectation in Table 2, where we split our sample to triangular and non-triangular 
legislative systems. According to Table 2 our findings are replicated outside 
triangular systems. This is clearly shown in Equations 1 and 2 of Table 2, where we 
re-estimate estimate Equations 1 and 4 of Table 1. However, and in line with the 
coalition compromise theories, in triangular systems, the cabinetÕs weighted average 
pledge best explains changes in welfare generosity. 
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Table 2: Cabinet commitments and portfolio control across legislative systems 
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	 Welfare		
Generosity	
Welfare		
Generosity	
Welfare		
Generosity	
Welfare		
Generosity	
	
	 Non	triangular	 Triangular	 	
Generosity	Lag	 0.9638***	 0.9521***	 0.7281***	 0.6336***	
	 (0.042)	 (0.043)	 (0.140)	 (0.147)	
Econ.	Growth	 0.0281	 0.0439	 0.0670	 0.0645	
	 (0.036)	 (0.030)	 (0.051)	 (0.043)	
Left	cabinet	seats	%	 0.0040	 0.0030	 -0.0039*	 -0.0048**	
	 (0.005)	 (0.004)	 (0.002)	 (0.001)	
Ave	Cabinet	Pledge	 -0.0016	 -0.0035	 0.1602***	 0.1627**	
	 (0.022)	 (0.022)	 (0.039)	 (0.059)	
SD	S.	Affairs	 -0.0476	
	
-0.0020	
		 (0.030)	
	
(0.016)	
	Left	Pledge	 -0.1831	 -0.1455	 -0.9263*	 -0.9142*	
	 (0.215)	 (0.224)	 (0.361)	 (0.366)	
Left	Pledge*	SD	Affairs	 0.0792*	
	
-0.0415	
		 (0.038)	
	
(0.040)	
	Net	Pledge	
	
-0.0633***	
	
-0.0490	
	
	
(0.017)	
	
(0.047)	
Net	Pledge*	SD	Affairs	
	
0.1014**	
	 		
	
(0.043)	
	 	Time	Trend	 -0.0177	 -0.0178	 -0.0034	 -0.0091	
	 (0.018)	 (0.018)	 (0.020)	 (0.018)	
Constant	 2.2347*	 2.6168**	 8.9822*	 12.3224**	
	 (1.041)	 (0.981)	 (3.539)	 (4.689)	
	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 134	 134	 58	 58	
R-squared	 0.899	 0.900	 0.828	 0.826	
Number	of	countries	 8	 8	 6	 6	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	 	 	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	 	 	
All models include country fixed effects 
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Discussion 
 
In this paper we argue and illustrate that electoral commitments potentially 
have important policy implications. Specifically, we predict that in a situation where 
two parties bargain over social welfare policy through their cabinet ministers, the 
party with the highest audience costs will have the largest policy influence. In turn, 
partiesÕ electoral costs are determined by the level of their public commitment made 
on welfare policy, the saliency of welfare policy to their voters, and whether the party 
controls the portfolio of social affairs. We test our predictions in eight parliamentary 
democracies over 40 years and find strong support for our argument. Social 
democratic parties have been more successful in increasing welfare generosity when 
they have made a strong pro-social welfare electoral commitment and they controlled 
the portfolios of social affairs and/or finance. In contrast, party size, portfolio control 
or strong electoral pledges alone fail to predict policy.  
The findings of this paper make a number of important contributions. First, 
they provide evidence in support of the argument that words matter. Some argue that 
electoral promises are cheap talk (Schattschneider 1942). Yet others have shown that 
parties in fact follow through with many of their electoral promises (Petry and Collete 
2009; Mansergh and Thomson 2007). Our theory identifies the conditions under 
which partiesÕ electoral platforms are more likely to matter for policy outcomes in 
multiparty cabinets. By doing that, we address a cornerstone question of democratic 
governance, whether electoral commitments matter for policy outcomes and when.  
Second, we provide the necessary theoretical tools to understand how and why 
parties can affect policy. Specifically, existing literature does not provide satisfactory 
answers as to whether and why the control of specific portfolios enables parties to 
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successfully redeem electoral pledges (Thomson 2001; Mansergh and Thomson 2007; 
Thomson et al. 2014). We offer an explanation for the lack of consensus in the 
existing literature about the policy effects of partisan ministerial portfolios (Goodhart 
2013; Becher 2010; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Martin and Vanberg 2014). We show 
that controlling the social affairs portfolio is a necessary but by no means a sufficient 
condition for implementing preferred reforms. Third, by providing a model of 
policymaking in multiparty cabinets and by putting it to test against existing models 
of policymaking, we contribute to current research, which, as Strom, Muller, and 
Bergman (2008) point out, has Òbarely scratched the surface of the issue of coalition 
governanceÓ.  
Our findings suggest that parties are accountable to voters in multiparty 
cabinets but under certain conditions. Accountability increases when parties control 
portfolios that deal with salient policies for their core voters. Consequently, partiesÕ 
electoral costs also increase when party core voters perceive parties as being 
responsible for adopting policies that go against their electoral promises on salient 
issues. Thus, diffusion of responsibility and blame sharing (Powell and Whitten 1993) 
does not have to be as successful as often thought in multiparty cabinets. 
Importantly, we reconcile the conflicting findings in the literature regarding 
the best model of policymaking in multiparty cabinets. We show that coalition 
compromise theories are the best model of policy making in triangular party systems 
but not in the more complex decentralized legislative systems or in systems strongly 
dominated by one party. Thus, our findings complement recent findings by Martin 
and Vanberg (2014). Finally, our results have important implications for the study of 
strategic portfolio allocation (Fernandes, Meinfelder, and Moury 2016) as well as the 
strategic delegation of cabinet ministers in multiparty cabinets (Alexiadou 2016).  
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